In memory of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood 1937–2023

This week, our former Law Lord and Supreme Court Justice Lord Brown passed away.

I enjoyed reading his obituary in the Daily Telegraph. At university, I rarely came across his judgments. Not only did he have a very brief stint at the Supreme Court, but he appears to 'focused' on judicial review (which is public law). At university, I was mostly focused on private law.

He came from a Jewish emigre family, did National Services in Cyprus, read history at Oxford, was called to the Bar and did his pupillage at Crown Office Row. Observed some interesting cases, and appeared against George Carman QC, and was involved in some IRA-related cases. 

In particular, I liked reading this:

Brown recalled that his dissent rate as a Law Lord increased the more experienced and confident he became, having at first been “in thrall” to his colleagues’ legal expertise and authority. His ultimate support for Jonathan Sumption’s appointment to the Supreme Court directly from practice at the Bar was based on what he saw as the “excessive soft-heartedness of a number of my colleagues” and the need for an injection of the “stern intellectual rigour and legal conservatism” he felt Sumption could provide.

Another interesting paragraph from The Spectator:

He was also highly critical of the Supreme Court’s decision in Evans (2015), which concerned the so-called ‘black-spider memos’ written by Prince Charles, as he then was, to ministers. The majority judgments, requiring disclosure of the letters, effectively excised from the Freedom of Information Act 2000 the Attorney General’s statutory power to block disclosure of information in the public interest. Brown wrote that the judgments ‘are not merely mistaken but give rise to a worrying impression of a tendency towards judicial supremacism. I should certainly have joined [the] dissent.’

I really enjoyed reading that paragraph. 

The very important Supreme Court case Evans v Attorney General concerned the relationship between the courts and Parliament. Professor Mark Elliott has a blog on the case. In short, Parliament conferred a power on the Attorney General to override decisions of a judicial tribunal body. In this case, it concerned the obligation to release King Charles's letters under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

I completely agree with the minority judgment (and Lord Brown) that Parliamentary sovereignty requires the courts to give effect to the clear will of Parliament through statute; or as per Lord Wilson in his dissent: rewriting not interpretation.

Well, farewell then Lord Brown, and your interesting life.